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George v. International Sod 
O n June 17, 1983, a California superior court jury returned a verdict against a group of Hare 
Krishna devotees and found in favor of a 
former sect disciple and her mother, 
awarding the plaintiffs an amount over 
$32 million in damages. I Robin George, 
the co,plaintiff, was fourteen years old 
in 1974 when she ran away from home 
to join a Laguna Beach, California 
Krishna Temple. Thereafter Miss George 
was shuffled among temples in Louisana, 
New York and Canada, allegedly to pre' 
vent her parents from learning of her 
whereabouts. Miss George's father suf, 
fered a fatal stroke one year after the un, 
successful attempts to locate her. Sub, 
sequently, Miss George recanted the 
Krishna faith and joined by her mother, 
instituted suit against the various 
temples which had harbored her and, in 
particular, against the leaders of the 
Laguna Beach and New Orleans temples. 
The jury awarded damages upon causes 
of action that alleged false imprison, 
ment, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, wrongful death, and libel,2 
The decision is significant for two rea, 
sons: first, the award easily surpassed the 
previous record California verdict against 
a religious organization (a $1.7 million 
judgment in 1981 against Synanon,3 
another unpopular alternative religious 
society); second, it provides an oppor, 
tunity to analyze various state,protected 
individual interests, reflected in the 
causes of action, against the interests 
protected under the First Amendment 
Clauses.4 Those clauses, functioning 
together,S have been interpreted as pro, 
tecting the individual exercise of free, 
dom of religion from undue interference, 
preference or establishment of a parti, 
cular set of religious beliefs to the exclu, 
sion of less popular beliefs,6 such as the 
Krishna sect holds.7 It is the thesis of this 
article that extreme punitive awards, as 
in the George case, are a form of punish, 
ment for religious beliefs and religiously, 
motivated behavior, if left intact after 
judicial review. Therefore, actions in, 
volving a recanting plaintiff who dis, 
avows his consent should be disfavored 
as infringing upon the constitutional 
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rights of a religious society defendant. 
This article will examine the history of 
the Religion Clauses and their applica, 
tion to cases involving alternative reli, 
gions. It will include an examination of 
the specific causes of action upon which 
the George verdict rested, and concludes 
that excessive punitive damage awards 
are a form of jury bias against unpopular 
religious beliefs in violation of the First 
Amendment Religion Clauses. 
In the period preceding 1791, in 
Europe, the norm was a system of civil 
government encompassing a sanctioned 
set of religious principles. The establish, 
ment of a religion was typified by the de, 
signation of a state church, with rights 
and privileges arrogated to the church 
and its members. These attributes in' 
cluded: 1) official recognition and pro, 
tection by the sovereign; 2) the right to 
compel religious orthodoxy under threat 
of fine or imprisonment; 3) the ability to 
finance the church through taxes upon 
the general community; 4) the sole ability 
to conduct public worship; and 5) the 
sole ability to perform valid marriages, 
burials and other solemn rites.8 
While it might have been surmised 
that the American colonial response to 
religious repression of dissidents in 
Europe would have been a greater show, 
ing of religious tolerance, prior to the 
Bill of Rights, the initial response of the 
colonies was to establish their own 
favored religions and to civilly suppress 
dissenters as heretics.9 The earliest state 
constitutional safeguards of civil and 
political rights from religious discrim, 
ination were enacted in 1776, fifteen 
years prior to the ratification of the First 
Amendment. 10 
A process of disestablishment, aimed 
at eliminating the rights and privileges of 
establishment (as earlier enumerated), II 
and progress toward religious freedom 
was gradual. 12 For example, in 1776, 
Virginia was the first state to enact a 
guarantee against religious discrimi, 
nation; 13 however, its dissenting sects 
were still struggling for equality before 
the law as late as 1785.14 It was not until 
1798 that all the laws preventing self, 
regulation of dissenting religious societies 
in that state were repealed and state' 
granted lands to the established church 
were confiscated. IS Virginia's experience 
of maintaining incidences of an estab, 
lished religion was not unique among 
the states.16 The available evidence points 
to the conclusion that most states were 
content with their own internal efforts at 
disestablishment and primarily amended 
the Constitution by adding the Religion 
Clauses in order to preempt the federal 
government from establishing a church 
of its own.17 
After ratification of the First Amend, 
ment Religion Clauses, the states con, 
tinued disestablishment at their deliber, 
ate pace and early Supreme Court de, 
cis ions reflected the Court's attitude 
that the right of free exercise and the 
prohibition against establishment were 
inapplicable to state practices. 18 A series 
of decisions, however, resulted in a 
gradual disintegration of this attitude. 
The first of such decisions was the ratifi, 
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
1868.19 Then, in 1878, the Supreme 
Court decided Reynolds v. U.S. 20 which 
involved a Mormon who appealed his 
conviction under a Congressional statute 
outlawing bigamy in t~rritories under 
federal control. In affirming the convic, 
tion, the Court considered the history of 
the First Amendment and decided that 
its purpose was to build "a wall of separ, 
arion between church and State."21 Fur, 
ther, the Court advanced a dichotomy 
between religious beliefs and religiously, 
motivated actions-the First Amend, 
ment was meant to deprive Congress of 
all power to legislate regarding the for, 
mer, in which legislation would consti, 
tute an establishment, but not the latter 
when such legislation legitimately sought 
to preserve secular duties and good pub, 
lie order,zz Applying that dichotomy to 
the situation before it, the Reynolds Court 
reasoned that marriage was a relationship 
created and protected by civil authority; 
therefore, subject to legitimate civil 
regulation in the public interest.23 Thus, 
the Court enunciated standards for First 
Amendment challenges based upon aI, 
leged violations of the establishment 
prohibition24 and the protected free 
exercise right, and established a balanc, 
ing test whereby individual actions taken 
in pursuance of the free exercise right 
would be weighed against legitimate 
governmental action taken in the public 
interest. Finally, the attitude of inappli, 
cability of the Religion Clauses to the 
states was reversed in the Supreme Court 
of Krishna 
decision of Cantwell v. Connecticut. 25 In 
this landmark decision, the Supreme 
Court applied the Fourteenth Amend~ 
ment so as to incorporate the First 
Amendment's religion protections as 
against the states. 
Cantwell, a Jehovah's Witness who 
was convicted of inciting a breach of the 
peace, had presented no clear and pre~ 
sent threat to public peace;26 however 
his street~corner ministering had included 
a bitter attack upon other organized reli~ 
gions, particularly Roman Catholicism. 
On that basis the Court, applying the 
balancing test employed in Reynolds, re~ 
versed the conviction, holding that upon 
the facts of the case, the colorable public 
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interest did not outweigh Cantwell's 
protected free exercise interest. 
The Supreme Court has refined its 
approach to challenges to governmental 
action based upon violations of protected 
Religion Clauses rights since the 1940 
Cantwell decision. The need for further 
refinement is evident, however, when 
one examines the increasing litigation 
regarding alternative religious societies. 
It has been held that a religion does not 
have to envision a supreme being to be 
entitled to First Amendment protec~ 
tion.27 Despite this constitutional pro~ 
tection, alternative religious societies are 
being forced to defend suits initiated by 
former devotees alleging tortious con~ 
duct suffered at the defendant church's 
hands. The results thus far have been 
mixed-federal claims against the 
churches have failed primarily because 
of jurisdictional or evidentiary short~ 
comings; however, state~based tort 
claims have survived preliminary mo~ 
tions.28 Issues of consent of a non~adult 
and of prejudice or bias against an un~ 
popular alternative. religion have not been 
addressed directly,29 although the trend 
in litigation involving alternative religions 
appears to be against these unpopular 
organizations,30 as is manifested in George 
v.ISKC. 
Factual determinations are crucial in 
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determining whether a verdict implicat~ 
ing a Religion Clauses violation, such as 
in the George case,31 will withstand the 
scrutiny of judicial review.32 The thres~ 
hold factual determination appears to be 
that of consent of the purported tort vic~ 
tim, for a valid consent33 would form an 
absolute defense to the claims upon 
which such a verdict rested.34 
While the co~plaintiff, Robin George, 
was approximately fourteen~years~old at 
the time she ran away from home and 
joined a Krishna temple, the mere fact of 
infancy should not foreclose the consent 
issue automatically.35 The question be~ 
comes one of the emancipated status of 
the minor child,36 for state law generally 
holds that, as between parent and child, 
such emancipated status leaves the 
minor unbenefitted by the parental obli~ 
gation of support for care, maintenance 
To attempt to guage 
the sincerity of an 
individual plaintiff's 
religious position 
would violate the free 
exercise and 
establishment rights 
of a religious society. 
and necessaries and consequently un~ 
burdened by the need for parental con~ 
sent.37 Furthermore, to determine eman~ 
cipation of unmarried minor children38 
facts and circumstances are considered,39 
including the intention of the parents,40 
although it is recognized that emancipa~ 
tion may result despite the parents' in~ 
tentions.41 California, the George case 
jurisdiction, has a law against emancipa~ 
tion based solely upon the actions of the 
child;42 however, the state's appellate 
courts have ruled this statute to be 
merely presumptive.43 There are strong 
indications that the parents in George did 
not acquiesce in their daughter's run~ 
ning away from home and thus had no 
intention of emancipating her by impli~ 
cation.44 This, however, begs the larger 
constitutional issues of whether a four~ 
teen~year~old child may be competent to 
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formulate a religious consent sufficient 
to effect a partial emancipation for that 
purpose ,45 and whether the Religion 
Clause would protect, the child's rights, 
as well as the religious society's rights 
arising from its reasonable belief of the 
child's competence to consent.46 
Objective determinations based upon 
empirical studies of capacity to formu~ 
late religious consent show that upon 
reaching the mental age of fourteen, a 
child does have such capacity47 and in~ 
deed reaches the age of greatest religious 
potentiality48 during an adolescence 
roughly stretching from ages twelve to 
sixteen.49 To go beyond this objective 
determination of religious capacity, 
however, and to attempt to gauge the 
sincerity of an individual plaintiff's reli~ 
gious position would violate the free 
exercise and establishment rights of a 
religious society. In U.S. v. Ballard,50 the 
Supreme Court held that absent an im~ 
posing and legitimate threat to society, 
the individual mode of expression and 
the motivation of joiners of a religious 
group are not subject to judicial deter~ 
mination.51 Consequently, practices such 
as relocating devotees from coast to coast 
and characterizing a devotee's parents as 
ttmeat~eating demons"52 without more, 
would be protected indoctrination. 
The state causes of action in George 
were false imprisonment, intentional in~ 
fliction of emotional distress, wrongful 
death, and libel. The largest single mone~ 
tary award was $1.5 million in compen~ 
satory and $15 million in punitive dam~ 
ages to the co~plaintiff, Robin George, 
for false imprisonment. 53 The elements 
of the tort of false imprisonment are a 
nonconsensual, intentional54 confine~ 
ment of a person without lawful privilege 
for an appreciable length of time. 55 Three 
elements of the action should be suspect 
in relation to a bona fide religious society 
such as the Krishnas: consent, intent and 
privilege.56 Absent a statutory presump~ 
tion, a civil plaintiff has a heavy burden 
of proving l~ck of consent57 to an exer~ 
cise of the right of conscience in matters 
of personal faith.58 Although the precise 
issues of plaintiff's lack of consent and 
possible prejudice against a defendant 
alternative religious society have not 
been reached by an appellate court,59 it 
has been held that the consent of a four~ 
teen~year~old minor is relevant to a pro~ 
secution for that minor's alleged false 
imprisonment60 and, further, that the 
good faith, motive and intent of the de~ 
fendant should affect liability61 as well as 
the measure of damages, particularly 
punitive damages.62 
Intentional infliction of emotional 
distress results from the unprivileged 
outrageous conduct of the defendant 
who, with intention to cause severe 
emotional distress, actually and proxi~ 
mately causes such harm to the plain~ 
tiff.63 Severe emotional distress is de~ 
fined as distress so substantial that no 
reasonable person in a civilized society 
should be expected to endure it.64 There 
is no fixed or absolute standard by 
which to compute the monetary value of 
the claimed emotional distress, and re~ 
covery by one person for the severe 
emotional distress suffered by another 
has been allowed.65 Under this cause of 
action, co~plaintiff Robin George was 
awarded $250,000 and her mother was 
awarded $1.5 million in compensatory 
damages,66 plus $12.25 million in puni~ 
tive damages was awarded to the pair.67 
The state acts 
unconstitutionally 
when it allows a 






However, the elements of consent, privi~ 
lege and intent should be presumed 
against the plaintiff, and a favorable jury 
verdict thereon should be suspect where 
a competent plaintiff recants a defen~ 
dant religious society. 6B A further trouble~ 
some element of the offense would be 
the necessity of outrageous conduct by 
the defendant; here again, the Religion 
Clauses would seem to allow great lati~ 
tude in unorthodox behavior by a de~ 
fendant religious institution before find~ 
ing malicious intent to engage in out~ 
rageous conduct.69 
Wrongful death actions, unknown at 
common law,70 are regulated in each 
state.71 Co~plaintiff Robin George was 
awarded $75,00072 and her mother 
received nothing for the wrongful death 
of Mr. George, who died of a stroke 
approximately one year after an unsuc~ 
cessful search for his daughter. 73 Ques~ 
tions of direct and proximate causality 
are raised upon the apparent facts of the 
case, although the facts are not known 
completely. The relatively modest award 
undoubtedly is a reflection of the fact 
that California only allows punitive 
damages in wrongful death actions 
under limited circumstances 74 absent 
from this case. The analysis regarding 
consent, privilege and intent75 would be 
equally valid with respect to a wrongful 
death action.76 
A cause of action in libel requires an 
unprivileged, false and malicious publi~ 
cation whereby a plaintiff is exposed to 
public scorn, hatred, contempt, or 
ridicule.77 Although the details of the 
alleged publication by the Krishnas 
against the plaintiffs, Robin George and 
her mother, are not known, 78 the 
elements of privilege by consent and 
intent79 would have to favor a protected 
religious society over a recanting 
plaintiff as religious freedom is within 
the scope of the constitutional protec~ 
tions. Similarly, the offending publica~ 
tion would have to be removed from 
religious opinion to lose the protection 
of first amendment free speech.80 
Plaintiff daughter was awarded $2,500 
and her mother $10,000 in compensa~ 
tory damages for the libel, in addition to 
sharing $2 million in punitive damages,81 
a punitive award so excessive when 
compared to the compensatory award as 
to suggest jury bias.82 
The punitive damages in the George 
case exceeded $29 million of a $32 
million total award;83 thus, it is proper 
to inquire whether the jury is attempting 
to punish the religious society for its 
unpopular beliefs. Not only are first 
amendment religious rights as incor~ 
porated into the due process concept 
involved, but also the award implicates 
fourteenth amendment equal protection 
rights,84 with judicial enforcement and 
review of jury actions providing the 
necessary state action to initiate a 
consitutional claim.85 State law requires 
a reasonable relationship between actual 
and punitive damages,86 even though no 
fixed ratio exists.87 All relevant factors 
are to be weighed in determining the 
amount of punitive damages,88 and a 
disproportionate ratio of damages raises 
a presumption of prejudice or passion.89 
Favored by such a damage presumption, 
an unpopular religious society, such as 
the Krishnas, should appeal an inordinate 
punitive award; to fail to do so would 
allow public bias to have its intended 
chilling effect upon the constitutional 
rights of the minority. 
The Religion Clauses face another 
turning point in their interpretation and 
application with the increasing contro~ 
versy surrounding new alternative reli~ 
gions, most of which are viewed with 
suspicion, contempt and hostility. In 
some cases, where the colorable religion 
has proven to be a dangerous cult, the 
suspicion and hostility of society have 
proven to be natural defensive reactions 
to a palpable evil. Nevertheless, the 
society's instinct's are not unerring, and 
our constitutional rights provide the 
most effective safeguards against the 
tyranny of the majority: The secular 
interests of the state in the well~being of 
minor children are not challenged nor 
are the constitutionally protected reli~ 
gious interests of competent persons 
who opt for belief in an alternative 
religion. It is in the balancing of these 
All relevant factors are 
to be weighed in 
determining the 
amount of punitive 
damages, and a 
disproportionate ratio 
of damages raises a 
presumption of 
prejudice or passion. 
substantial interests when they conflict 
that the courts are called upon to insure 
that neither interest is disregarded 
totally. The state court acts within the 
realm of reasonableness perhaps, when 
it draws the line of permissible religiously~ 
motivated behavior at harboring a 
minor child of questionable competence 
from his parents, even where there is a 
good faith belief in the competent 
consent of the child; the state acts 
unconstitutionally, however, when it 
allows a hostile public to inflict crippling 
punishment upon constitutionally~pro~ 
tected, though admittedly unpopular 
religious beliefs. W 
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SAVE-A .. HEART FOUNDATION, INC. 
S.A.H.'s Lifesaving Coronary Projects 
Sinai Hospital 
Save-A-Heart's initial goal was to establish a much 
needed catheterization lab at Sinai Hospital where this 
service could be made readily available to heart pa-
tients in the community. In 1977, the Foundation's 
dream became reality with the dedication of its 
$750,000 Cardiac Catheterization Center at Sinai. 
Equipped with the latest diagnostic tools and equip-
ment, it is one of the finest in the country. With this 
accomplished, Save-A-Heart, while continually adding 
new equipment to the Center, went on to establish other 
vital coronary projects throughout Metropolitan 
Baltimore. 
North Charles General Hospital 
Save-A-Heart's $100,000 gift to the newly expanded 
20-bed coronary care and intensive care units at North 
Charles General Hospital provided the newest, most 
modern telemetry and monitoring equipment. Con-
stant bedside surveillance, via this vital equipment, 
makes it possible to help save many hearts at North 
Charles General Hospital. While the expanding ICU! 
CCU was dedicated in 1982, Save-A-Heart continues 
its work on behalf of the hospital's coronary needs. 
Provident Hospital 
Recently, Save-A-Heart presented its latest "heart-
saver" to Provident Hospital; a $25,000 Echocardio-
graph Machine. Taking the echo image in two dimen-
sions, this piece of equipment not only permits a more 
precise cardiac diagnosis, but it increases the number 
of disease entities that can be diagnosed by echocar-
diograms. A vital force in the fight against heart dis-
ease at Provident Hospital. 
Baltimore County General Hospital 
Save-A-Heart's 40-bed $875,000 Coronary Intensive 
Care and Progressive Care Wing at Baltimore County 
General Hospital, the largest project the Foundation 
has ever undertaken, was completed in 1978. In addi-
tion to building and furnishing patient rooms in this 
area, Save-A-Heart has contributed telemetry and 
monitoring equipment, as well as other heartsaving 
devices, not only to the coronary wing, but to the 
hospital's Emergency Room. There is always a need for 
additional furnishings and equipment in the SAH 
Wing at Baltimore County General. 
Pikesville Volunteer Fire Company 
Two emergency Telemetry ambulances have been 
donated by the Save-A-Heart Foundation, in conjunc-
tion with the Covenant Guild, at a combined cost of 
over $100,000. The first, purchased in 1977, has since 
been replaced by a more advanced model, which has 
been on the streets since 1983. Also, for the new am-
bulance, the Foundation purchased a Thumper, which 
is a mechanical CPR device and other equipment. On 
the rescue scene in Pikesville and surrounding areas, 
look for the new SAH ambulance. 
Liberty Road Volunteer Fire Company 
On February 4, 1984, Save-A-Heart Foundation 
joined the Liberty Road Volunteer Fire Company in 
dedicating the company's brand new 1984SAH Road 
Rescue Ambulance. Made possible through Save-A-
Heart's contribution of $33,000, the Foundation was 
its major benefactor. Advanced life support systems, 
direct hospital telemetry and other vital systems and 
equipment make this vehicle a (flifesaver" throughout 
the Liberty Road Corridor. 
And Our Newest 1984 Projects 
$300,000 
Pledge to Franklin Square Hospital 
Coronary Unit 
$100,000 
Pledge to the Save-A-Heart 
Dr. Israel S. Zinberg Fund 
For The Prevention of Sudden Cardiac 
Death at Sinai Hospital 
JOIN 
SAV£..A .. HEART 
14 Old Court Road 
Baltimore, Maryland 21208 
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